The "Hostile" Acquirer: Andrews Corporation ("A")
(100 POINTS)
On 5/1/01, Susan Andrews, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and majority shareholder of Andrews
Corporation, a Texas publicly held corporation ("A"), sent a "bear hug" letter to Joseph Tallman,
Board Chairman, CEO and President of Tally Ho Corporation, a Delaware publicly traded
corporation ("T"). A and T are active competitors and both manufacture advanced missile
technology parts for the United States Air Force. The letter from Andrews informed Tallman that
A would be willing to take either of the following actions with regards to
T:
* the retention of key T management personnel, including Mr. Tallman (to serve as co-chairman of the combined companies);
* The management retention offer would also allow T's core management group to continue as core division managers in A, with substantial annual cash awards based on reaching defined productivity and growth targets;
* In addition, Andrews would be willing, as a "special accommodation," to cause A to make a one-time "hello and welcome to the team" cash payment of $250,000 to each inside director and/or member of senior management joining A's new team and a special $1 Million "goodbye payment" to each terminated inside board member; and
* A would guaranty payment, on a private purchase basis, of $85 per share for each share of director's and management's "insider" private, preferred shares held as of the date of Andrews's letter.
* no tender offer for T preferred shares, just a downstream forced exchange of A
* common and other securities in the second step freezeout merger;
* a subsequent "take no prisoners" "freezeout merger" of T into A, and
* upon takeover, the termination from employment of all T senior officers.
Finally, Andrews's letter states that T must respond to her letter by signing an enclosed binding
Letter of
Intent
no later than
5/22/01,
or else, the hostile tender offer will be commenced. The current common stock
price of T is $25 per share.
Mr. Tallman was on vacation at the time the Andrews letter was received by T. Consequently, he didn't read
the letter and the attached
Letter of Intent
until 5/9/01. After reading the correspondence, he immediately
called for a special meeting of the board of directors of T to discuss the Andrews letter and the
Letter of
Intent
The meeting was scheduled for May 15, 2001.
The T board is comprised of 7 directors, 4 of whom are also officers of T. The other 3 directors are outside
directors. T is a New York Stock Exchange listed corporation with one class of publicly traded common
stock and two classes of nontraded (private) preferred stock. Currently the inside directors own
approximately 30%, or 18 million common shares of the 60 Million
issued and outstanding shares of common stock of
T. The outside directors own an insignificant number of common
shares (less than .0001 %).
The first class of T preferred stock is voting redeemable preferred. As such, this class of stock is entitled to vote on an
equal basis (one share, one vote) with the common stockholders on all matters that the common shares vote on, and
pursuant to the terms pursuant to which this class of preferred was issued, the redeemable preferred may be
reacquired by T at any time, in a cash distribution at a per share purchase price of 125% times the previous month's
daily closing average price of the T common stock. The redeemable preferred stock is owned privately by nonaffiliated
investors who are not controlled by or subject to the influence of either T or
A.
The second class of preferred stock is nonvoting except that each share of preferred stock is entitled to vote alone with
the common shares and redeemable preferred shares on an equal basis (one share, one vote) in a merger or significant
asset sale transaction. The preferred stock is entirely owned by the T directors and officers, having been issued prior
to T corporation becoming a public company. In summary, the classes and number of shares of
T stock outstanding are as follows:
|
Outstanding Shares |
Authorized Shares |
|
|
Common Stock: |
60 Million Shares |
100 Million Shares |
|
Voting Redeemable Preferred: |
20 Million Shares |
20 Million Shares |
|
"Nonvoting" Preferred Stock: |
20 Million Shares |
120 Million Shares |
|
Total Shares Outstanding: |
100 Million Shares |
|
|
Total Shares Owned by T insiders: |
38 Million Shareso |
|
|
Total Insider Voting Control of T: |
38% |
|
o (18 MM common shares + 20 MM "nonvoting" preferred).
Note that T is obligated to numerous classes of bondholders holding unsecured corporate debts of T of various midterm maturities. Further, there are various significant trade accounts payable. In fact, the overall ratio of debt to equity is 3 to 1, the debt securities comprising the most significant aspect of the equity/liability side of T's balance sheet.
As counsel to the target T, you have been asked by Mr. Tallman to advise the board of your initial views of the following matters:
| Question 1: | First,
assuming the T board believes that a merger of T into A
is feasible and appropriate, if the T board approves the merger,
in addition to the 3 classes of shareholders, will the board likely need
to ask bondholders and unsecured trade creditors to ratify the merger
transaction? Briefly discuss. (10 points)
|
| Question 2: | Assuming arguendo that bondholders and unsecured trade creditors have no voting rights, may
the T board consider their interests and the interests of other constituencies, such as suppliers, current employees
and the local community where T conducts business, as relevant factors in deciding to endorse or contest A's
takeover plans? Briefly discuss. (10 points)
|
| Question 3: | Assume that, in response to the A "bear hug" letter, T's board meets and engages in a heated
discussion regarding A's proposals. In the course of the board discussion, one of T's consultants, (an outside
independent certified accountant who was expressly invited to the meeting), announces that: "Given the recent run up in value of T's stock, I would strongly recommend that T go forward with a "quick merger " closing with A since it's unlikely that T stock will ever reach a value equivalent to A's per share merger offer price in at least 5 years. As the board is no doubt aware, there has never been a better time for T shareholders to cash out. " Based solely upon this advice, T's board proceeds to quickly sign the binding letter of intent with A. As counsel to T, what concerns might you have with respect to this "decisive" board approach? Discuss. (15 Points)
|
| Question 4: | If T chooses to accept A's "friendly merger" alternative offer, are there any actual or likely conflicts
of interest that the board or senior management have vis a vis the T or its shareholders that are problematic? If so, list
two and list one possible solution that you might use to deal with a conflict. (10 points)
|
| Question 5: | Assuming T accepts A's merger proposal, list one demand that T may reasonably make of
A prior
to entering into any meaningful discussions regarding a strategic alliance by merger (the first choice offered by
A)
and sharing information regarding T with A. Further, in no more than two or three sentences, clearly describe your
rationale for making the particular demand. (10 points)
|
| Question 6: |
Assuming that the T board decides to reject the A merger proposal, given the current capital
structure of T, briefly provide your views as to the appropriateness of the following "shark repellants" for
consideration to be used by T in avoiding the A takeover: B) Adopt Class Voting to Assure Control Retention: Immediate adoption by the T board of directors of a bylaw amendment requiring that: "in matters involving extraordinary corporate transactions, including mergers and significant asset acquisitions, each class of stock shall be entitled to vote as a class... " Discuss your views. (10 points) C) Adopt Shareholder Rights Plan to Thwart Takeover: Immediate adoption by the T board of directors of a Shareholder Rights Plan which: "triggers, upon the unapproved acquisition of 20% or more of T common stock or upon the announcement of an unapproved tender offer, the distribution of share rights in a 4 to 1 ratio to all common shareholders not involved in the unapproved acquisition or tender offer... " Please briefly discuss. (10 points) D) Board Resolution to Redeem Redeemable Preferred to Assure Control Retention: Immediate resolution of the T board to redeem the redeemable preferred shares, thereby increasing the T management share ownership percentage from 36% (36 Million shares/100 Million shares) to 45% (36 Million shares/80 Million Shares). Please discuss. (10 points) E) Adopt all Plans at Once? Assuming the board of T wants to pursue all of the options listed in #6A-D above, do you see any additional legal problem faced by T solely because its board of directors chooses to "play it safe" and adopt all of the shark repellant options? Please discuss in a sentence or two. (5 points) |
15 POINT EXTRA CREDIT QUESTION:
Of the 4 different shark repellant alternatives listed in 6A-D above, which one of the four alternatives is most likely to be sustained by a reviewing state court based on a standard of review which upholds the corporate action under the "equal dignities rule," also called the doctrine of separate legal independence?" (15 Points)
END OF EXAMINATION