Mergers and Acquisitions
Professor Karlin
Spring 2001

 

 

PART II: 

The Target: Tally Ho Corporation ("T")
The "Hostile" Acquirer: Andrews Corporation ("A")

(100 POINTS)

On 5/1/01, Susan Andrews, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and majority shareholder of Andrews Corporation, a Texas publicly held corporation ("A"), sent a "bear hug" letter to Joseph Tallman, Board Chairman, CEO and President of Tally Ho Corporation, a Delaware publicly traded corporation ("T"). A and T are active competitors and both manufacture advanced missile technology parts for the United States Air Force. The letter from Andrews informed Tallman that A would be willing to take either of the following actions with regards to T:  

(1) Form a "strategic alliance" in a friendly merge r, on terms acceptable to A, providing for: 

OR, in the Alternative, Should the A Board not be willing to proceed as described above,

(2) Andrews Corporation will engage in a hostile tender offer for control of T shares, with terms providing for:

Finally, Andrews's letter states that T must respond to her letter by signing an enclosed binding Letter of Intent no later than 5/22/01, or else, the hostile tender offer will be commenced. The current common stock price of T is $25 per share.

Mr. Tallman was on vacation at the time the Andrews letter was received by T. Consequently, he didn't read the letter and the attached Letter of Intent until 5/9/01. After reading the correspondence, he immediately called for a special meeting of the board of directors of T to discuss the Andrews letter and the Letter of Intent The meeting was scheduled for May 15, 2001.

The T board is comprised of 7 directors, 4 of whom are also officers of T. The other 3 directors are outside directors. T is a New York Stock Exchange listed corporation with one class of publicly traded common stock and two classes of nontraded (private) preferred stock. Currently the inside directors own approximately 30%, or 18 million common shares of the 60 Million  issued and outstanding shares of common stock of T. The outside directors own an insignificant number of common shares (less than .0001 %).

The first class of T preferred stock is voting redeemable preferred. As such, this class of stock is entitled to vote on an equal basis (one share, one vote) with the common stockholders on all matters that the common shares vote on, and pursuant to the terms pursuant to which this class of preferred was issued, the redeemable preferred may be reacquired by T at any time, in a cash distribution at a per share purchase price of 125% times the previous month's daily closing average price of the T common stock. The redeemable preferred stock is owned privately by nonaffiliated investors who are not controlled by or subject to the influence of either T or A.

The second class of preferred stock is nonvoting except that each share of preferred stock is entitled to vote alone with the common shares and redeemable preferred shares on an equal basis (one share, one vote) in a merger or significant asset sale transaction. The preferred stock is entirely owned by the T directors and officers, having been issued prior to T corporation becoming a public company. In summary, the classes and number of shares of T stock outstanding are as follows:

 

Outstanding Shares

Authorized Shares

Common Stock:

60 Million Shares

100 Million Shares

Voting Redeemable Preferred:

20 Million Shares

20 Million Shares

"Nonvoting" Preferred Stock:

20 Million Shares

120 Million Shares

Total Shares Outstanding:

100 Million Shares

 
     

Total Shares Owned by T insiders:

38 Million Shareso

Total Insider Voting Control of T:

38%

o (18 MM common shares + 20 MM "nonvoting" preferred).

 

Note that T is obligated to numerous classes of bondholders holding unsecured corporate debts of T of various midterm maturities. Further, there are various significant trade accounts payable. In fact, the overall ratio of debt to equity is 3 to 1, the debt securities comprising the most significant aspect of the equity/liability side of T's balance sheet.

As counsel to the target T, you have been asked by Mr. Tallman to advise the board of your initial views of the following matters:

Question 1: First, assuming the T board believes that a merger of T into A is feasible and appropriate, if the T board approves the merger, in addition to the 3 classes of shareholders, will the board likely need to ask bondholders and unsecured trade creditors to ratify the merger transaction? Briefly discuss. (10 points)

 

Question 2: Assuming arguendo that bondholders and unsecured trade creditors have no voting rights, may the T board consider their interests and the interests of other constituencies, such as suppliers, current employees and the local community where T conducts business, as relevant factors in deciding to endorse or contest A's takeover plans? Briefly discuss. (10 points)

 

Question 3: Assume that, in response to the A "bear hug" letter, T's board meets and engages in a heated discussion regarding A's proposals. In the course of the board discussion, one of T's consultants, (an outside independent certified accountant who was expressly invited to the meeting), announces that:

"Given the recent run up in value of T's stock, I would strongly recommend that T go forward with a "quick merger " closing with A since it's unlikely that T stock will ever reach a value equivalent to A's per share merger offer price in at least 5 years. As the board is no doubt aware, there has never been a better time for T shareholders to cash out. "

Based solely upon this advice, T's board proceeds to quickly sign the binding letter of intent with A. As counsel to T, what concerns might you have with respect to this "decisive" board approach? Discuss. (15 Points)

 

Question 4: If T chooses to accept A's "friendly merger" alternative offer, are there any actual or likely conflicts of interest that the board or senior management have vis a vis the T or its shareholders that are problematic? If so, list two and list one possible solution that you might use to deal with a conflict. (10 points)

 

Question 5: Assuming T accepts A's merger proposal, list one demand that T may reasonably make of A prior to entering into any meaningful discussions regarding a strategic alliance by merger (the first choice offered by A) and sharing information regarding T with A. Further, in no more than two or three sentences, clearly describe your rationale for making the particular demand. (10 points)

 

Question 6:

Assuming that the T board decides to reject the A merger proposal, given the current capital structure of T, briefly provide your views as to the appropriateness of the following "shark repellants" for consideration to be used by T in avoiding the A takeover:

A) Issue More "Nonvoting" Preferred to Assure Control Retention: Immediate resolution of the T board of directors to issue to T management 30 Million nonvoting Preferred Shares authorized but previously unissued, such that T insiders would control 68 Million of a total of 130 million issued and outstanding shares of preferred and common stock. Discuss your views. (10 points)

B) Adopt Class Voting to Assure Control Retention: Immediate adoption by the T board of directors of a bylaw amendment requiring that: "in matters involving extraordinary corporate transactions, including mergers and significant asset acquisitions, each class of stock shall be entitled to vote as a class... " Discuss your views. (10 points)

C) Adopt Shareholder Rights Plan to Thwart Takeover: Immediate adoption by the T board of directors of a Shareholder Rights Plan which: "triggers, upon the unapproved acquisition of 20% or more of T common stock or upon the announcement of an unapproved tender offer, the distribution of share rights in a 4 to 1 ratio to all common shareholders not involved in the unapproved acquisition or tender offer... " Please briefly discuss. (10 points)

D) Board Resolution to Redeem Redeemable Preferred to Assure Control Retention: Immediate resolution of the T board to redeem the redeemable preferred shares, thereby increasing the T management share ownership percentage from 36% (36 Million shares/100 Million shares) to 45% (36 Million shares/80 Million Shares). Please discuss. (10 points)

E) Adopt all Plans at Once? Assuming the board of T wants to pursue all of the options listed in #6A-D above, do you see any additional legal problem faced by T solely because its board of directors chooses to "play it safe" and adopt all of the shark repellant options? Please discuss in a sentence or two. (5 points)

 

15 POINT EXTRA CREDIT QUESTION:

Of the 4 different shark repellant alternatives listed in 6A-D above, which one of the four alternatives is most likely to be sustained by a reviewing state court based on a standard of review which upholds the corporate action under the "equal dignities rule," also called the doctrine of separate legal independence?" (15 Points)

 

END OF EXAMINATION

 
THANKS FOR A GREAT SEMESTER! -Professor Karlin